Paper Abstracts

Panel 1. Asianization, Sovereignty and Rivalry: Power Relations

Discussion Moderator: Joost Herman

Paper presentation 1: David Kerr - 'Taking - or avoiding - the path to China-US rivalry: European perspectives and responses'

Stephen Walt has said that one of the five big questions we should be asking about the 21st Century is whether China will continue to tolerate American military predominance in Asia

or whether it will take sustained efforts to force the US out of the region (Foreign Policy, December 2013). China and America are not yet rivals - they can each exercise their existing strategic capacities and interests without directly challenging or impeding the other. But geopolitical issues and tensions have undoubtedly risen in the last 10 years and show no signs of abating. China claims to have found a “new kind of great power relations” with America in which the two sides will “through creative thinking and concrete steps, prove that the traditional belief that big powers are bound to enter into confrontation and conflicts is wrong” (Hu Jintao, May 2012). However China’s rise and its desire to create new strategic space for itself and America’s desire to restrict attempts to revise the strategic status quo in the Asia-Pacific are entirely conventional for relations between a rising and a dominant strategic power. Thus although China and America are not yet rivals the path to rivalry is plainly there. Members of the Asia-Pacific community and interested outsiders from further away need to examine, and potentially influence, the future direction of China-US relations - will China and America take or avoid the path to rivalry, and what can third parties do?

For Europe the changes to the strategic balance in Asia will prove very significant. The Atlantic community has been the dominant strategic centre of world affairs for several generations but it has now lost this position. The US re-balance to Asia expresses and reinforces a diplomatic and security shift from West to East - Asian capitalism, democracy, technologies, and security will occupy the places that Europe held in the 20th century. In consequence the US-European relationship will be increasingly ‘civilianised’: it will revolve around diplomacy, institutions, commercial and knowledge power, but is likely to see ongoing disengagement in strategic affairs, with further dilution of NATO in consequence. Europe will attempt to strategise its relationship with China but it is fairly clear that the Chinese do not see Europe or European governments as having a significant role in the future of Asian strategic politics. Europe believes that it can play a role in influencing Asian strategic affairs and may even be able to assert some influence - in conjunction with Asian partners - over the path of China-US relations. But Europe’s perspectives on these questions needs much more definition: what do Europeans think about the future of US China relations? What postures should Europe adopt and in what forums? What influence can Europe bring to bear on the most important bilateral strategic relationship of this century? This paper will offer a short introduction to these problems.

Paper presentation 2: Christopher Lamont - 'Promoting Multilateralism in East Asia? Air Defense Identification Zones and Unraveling Security in East Asia'

Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs), designated areas of non‐territorial airspace where States impose reporting obligations on civil and military aircraft, constitute a highly contentious security practice, and in the absence of an international legal framework to regulate unilateral ADIZ declarations by States, find themselves increasingly contested with States advancing competing claims on the limits of their scope and reporting obligations. China’s November 23, 2013 declaration of an East China Sea ADIZ highlights two important questions that arise from this contested security practice. The first question stems from conflicting positions on the extent to which States can impose reporting obligations on aircraft operating outside of territorial airspace, while the second question revolves around what, if any, impact the limited exercise of sovereignty in airspace can have upon territorial claims advanced by States. In order to explore both of the above questions this article will

provide an introduction to the practice and law of ADIZs before examining two distinct ADIZ regimes, those maintained by the United States and China. This article will observe that while international law does not prohibit States from declaring ADIZs in non‐territorial airspace, it does prohibit States from restricting air navigation outside of territorial airspace and thus certain reporting requirements demanded on the part of States may extend beyond what is permissible under international law.

Paper presentation 3: Tobias Burgers - 'History Reversed: The West Should Starting Copying the East. What and Why the EU Should Learn from Military and Security Developments in East-Asia'

Asia has been long regarded by Europeans as a region well expertized in copying western products and technology. However, (and) to quote Bob Dylan “the times are changing” . Asia now leads and Europe is somewhere hobbling behind. This has not only lead to a deteriorating global economic situation for the EU, but is decreasing its security as well: Many of the security threats of the 21^st century are arising in East-Asia and are highly transnational in nature. The days that the mere geographical distance would protect Europe are over. The rise of cyberwarfare, a field in which East-Asian nations – in particular China – are leading, exemplifies this. Cyberthreats are not bounded by conventional and geographical boundaries, can reach Europe with seconds and have to potential to cause major destruction. The EU is highly vulnerable to such threats and therefore it should, among other options, seek to “copy” the skills and knowledge the East-Asia nations gained in cyberwarfare in order to enhance its security. The first step in this process would be an increased military and security cooperation with the East-Asian nations in this sector. The days that the East “copied” the West are over. It is time the West starts to cope with the new security reality and starts to “copy” the East. However, and as the CfP notes there is a limited appetite among East-Asian nations to cooperate and exchange information on this topic and broader security affairs in general with the EU, as the EU is still perceived as an actor lacking a single voice in security affairs. The question thus arises which options are actually available for the EU to increase security cooperation with East-Asian nations. The proposed paper will try to answer this question through focusing on how this could be achieved in the field of cyberwarfare and – security.

Paper presentation 4: Chang Kyung-Sup - 'Asianization of Asia: Asia’s Integrative Ascendance through a European Aperture'

It seems the so-called “rise of Asia” discourse has not yet met with any enthusiastic collective response by Asians themselves. While it has been pronounced among Western political, journalistic, and, gradually, academic circles as a buzzword for the political economic order of the new century, most Asians still remain hesitant about or unaccustomed to pondering their fate within the collective epistemological frame of “Asia”. Perhaps, the “rise of Asian nations” may sound more easily comprehensible to them. In neither Westerners’ hegemonic anxiousness about the rise of Asia nor Asians’ enthusiasm about national successes is systematically comprehended the critical political economic, social, and even civilizational trend in the new century – namely, the “Asianization” of (modern) Asia (Funabashi, 1993). This is a trend much comparable to the Europeanization of (modern) Europe in earlier centuries, but has required the disembedding of Asian nations from the EuroAmericadictated order of bilateral dependencies and controls and their (re)embedding into the neoliberal global system of capitalist political economy whose parameters are still dominated by EuroAmerica. Asia is rising while it is being simultaneously integrated or even (re)constructed internally. The internal integration of Asian nations and peoples – most conspicuously in economic terms, but gradually in social, cultural, and demographic terms as well – has enabled them to find and utilize each other as unexplored resources for sustained economic, social, and cultural advancement. In essence, however, a neoliberal capitalist Asia is on the rise, so that its economic ascendance has been accompanied by diverse and complex tendencies toward transnational socioeconomic exploitation, cultural conflict, human rights abuse, environmental destruction, etc. There is a pressing need to urgently revamp sociology (and the other social sciences) in order to deal with the various postnational/supranational processes, structures, and actions in Asia-as-a-society adequately. A sociology of Asia is as much necessitated as a sociology of Europe (Roche, 2010), implying a great scientific potential for interregional collaboration.

Panel 2. China and the EU: Culture, Strategy and Media

Discussion moderator: Stefania Travagnin

Paper presentation 5: Daniel Hammond & Jing Jing - 'Weak politics – A Strategic or Cultural Misunderstanding? An Analysis of Chinese Priorities in Sino-EU and Sino-ASEAN Relations under the Xi and Li regime'

This paper will explore and compare Sino-EU and Sino-ASEAN relations. In particular we are interested in explaining the theme of weak politics when China engages with regional organisations. Focusing on developments under the newly established leadership regime of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang this paper will first discuss whether weak politics exists between China and the EU, and China and ASEAN. It will then seek to provide an explanation for any differences or similarities between the two cases. Based on both a content analysis of Chinese language newspaper articles and a discussion of academic discourses on Chinese relations with the EU and ASEAN we will argue that the sense of weak politics experienced in these relationships can be put down to two reasons. First, a strategic misunderstanding of how China forges relations with regional organisations and what it wants from them; and, second, a cultural misunderstanding which is grounded in the way China presents itself to the world. We argue that in order for the EU, especially, to move beyond weak politics then a new understanding of what constitutes politics, and a political relationship with Beijing, may need to be established. ASEAN can provide a case from which the EU can learn how to engage China.

Paper presentation 6: Garrie van Pinxteren - 'European Journalists in China: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place'

More and more, policymakers in Europe express the view that European journalists are biased towards China. They are seen as hindering rather than helping to promote better relations and more understanding between China and the EU. Policymakers tend to see journalists as playing into hidden fears and prejudices about China in Europe and as not playing a positive role in promoting understanding of the tremendous transformation China is going through.

On the Chinese side, European journalist seem to have disappointed their hosts as well. They have been welcomed to China in the hope that their reporting would naturally become more positive if they lived in China over an extended period of time. This hope, however, has greatly diminished, especially after the Tibetan riots in March 2008. Foreign reporting was portrayed as bad, biased and sloppy in the Chinese media. 1 Since 2008, foreign journalists have become less rather than more welcome in China both on the state and the non-state level.

The questions most often asked are: to what degree is the criticism on European correspondents correct? Has a possible negative bias increased in recent years, and if so, based on what? These are important questions that definitely deserve more research.

However, as an ex- China-correspondent, I have never felt quite at ease with these questions. They overlook the fact that changing opinions about European reporting on China are largely based on developments outside of the realm of journalism itself. If we do not look at these outside developments, we will not be able to fully grasp the reasons behind the shift in opinion about China-reporting in recent years.

This paper argues that two main developments are crucial in understanding the growing criticism on journalists. One is the growing European awareness that China can no longer be portrayed as a country that does badly in fields like human rights and that should be willing to receive instructions by the EU on how to improve. China is more and more seen as a powerful player that needs to some extent be appeased, so that a weakening Europe does not lose out on possibilities to reap economic benefits of China’s growth. Reporting on questions related to human rights is therefore more and more seen as inappropriate and harmful to the interests of Europe. However, the European journalist on the ground sees that human rights abuses, as well as environmental problems and problems around food security, have become more frequent and more serious. He will feel a professional need to report on that, a need he would also feel when based in Africa or the United States.

The second development is a growing national pride and self-assuredness on the Chinese side. Chinese authorities feel that it should no longer be necessary to depend on foreign reporters to project a positive image of China abroad. China has on the one hand made it more difficult for foreign reporters to obtain and retain resident visa for China 2 , and on the other hand has invested on a large scale in expanding their own capacity to provide news about China directly to foreign media 3 , without the ‘interference’ of foreign reporters. The foreign correspondent gets less access on the ground and at the same time feels more pressure to selfcensor, since neither he nor the medium he works for will be happy when his visa is not prolonged.

To conclude: For a correspondent in China, life has grown more difficult. On the one hand, China becomes less and less welcoming and accommodating, on the other hand Europe does little to support the independence of its correspondents in China. European officials too frequently agree with China in wishing that China-correspondents choose a more positive, or, with a euphemistic term, more ‘balanced’ tone.

As an ex- China-correspondent, I would recommend that EU-policymakers take a closer look at what they are in fact asking from their foreign correspondents. Do they really want them to become more ‘positive’? Or are they willing to put more effort in protecting the independent position of China-correspondents in Europe? The second would require policymakers to be cautious in expressing informal demands for more positive reports on the one hand, and firm against pressure and hindrance of China-correspondents by Chinese authorities on the other.

1 See for instance http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008‐04/02/content_6587120.htm for Chinese criticism on CNN, but also on the BBC and on various German media.

2 See for instance http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom‐press/2013/china, where it is mentioned that in 2012, two foreign reporters were forced to leave China for the first time in 14 years. In 2013. On more

Paper presentation 7: Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar - '16+1 As a New Format of China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation?'

A few years ago Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) did not play a very important role in China’s foreign policy. Both sides were not very interested in each other. CEE countries (e.g. V4 countries) during the political and economic transformation after the end of the Cold War were preoccupied with domestic affairs, strengthening relations with neighbors and achieving two absolutely strategic goals – joining NATO and EU. China as a distant partner was not seen as a priority. At the same time, China after Tiananmen pacification decided to implement Deng’s taoguang yanghui concept, concentrating on domestic issues, and keeping low profile in its foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the membership in NATO and EU did not change China-CEE relations remarkably. Relations were proper but not very intensive. The turning point was the global financial and economic crisis. The CEE have noticed that China is an economic and political partner to be reckoned with, while the PRC started to look at the CEE as a stable (especially in terms of economy) region, despite the crisis.

In the last two years one can observe China’s rising interest in closer cooperation with CEE. April 2012 might be perceived as a symbolic beginning of China’s new strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe. It was a time of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to Poland. Apart from talks with Polish officials, he attended a meeting in Warsaw with prime ministers from 16 Central and Eastern European countries . During the visit Chinese leader presented a document “China’s 12 Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern Countries”, widely known as 12-point strategy. While 16+1 meeting in Warsaw seemed to be an ad hoc meeting, the second summit in the same format in Bucharest (November 2013) and adopted Bucharest Guidelines is widely acknowledged as an institutionalisation of 16+1 cooperation.

The aim of this paper is to concisely present characteristics of 16+1 format. I would like to shortly describe the origin of this concept, its members, its strong and weak points. My intention is also to dispel myths connected with this format and try to answer the question if it is a threat for the EU China policy and generally for the EU taking into account the fact that the format encompasses eleven EU and five non-EU members. Bearing in mind that there are doubts about this format, it is worth evaluating results of 16+1 cooperation comparing declarations (mainly the so-called 12 Measures and Bucharest Guidelines) with the real actions.

Panel 3. Political Economy of East Asia and the EU

Discussion Moderator: Miriam Wilhelm

Paper presentation 8: Werner Pascha - 'Overcoming Economic Weakness in Japan and the EU: The Political Economy of Reforms and Lessons for Mutual Learning'

Japan and the EU face common threat economic weakness, for instance the danger of deflation and high debt levels - differences notwithstanding. Both have recently followed quite different paths to cope with these challenges : While Japan has embarked on a highly ambitious stimulus program and reforms are still somewhat lacking ("Abenomics"), the EU and particularly the Euro group has focussed on a road of reforms, while stimulus concepts meet severe opposition (e.g., the discussion about the Outright Monetary Transactions). In the presentation, both paths will be illuminated and compared from the perspective of the political economy of reform. It is argued that political entrepreneurship and "ideas", which have recently been subject to increased scholarly attention, play an important role to understand the developments. Finally, potentials and problems of mutual learning are discussed, taking the literature on international policy transfer into account.

Paper presentation 9: Maaike Okano-Heijmans - 'The Asian Development Bank: What’s in it for Europe?'

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) remains largely under the radar of most officials, politicians and observers. In times of economic difficulty and global power shifts, however, European countries stand to gain from taking a closer look at their membership of the Bank, the oldest regional institution in Asia. They stand to benefit from deeper engagement with the ADB, both on practical matters as well as for strategic purposes. The Bank positively contributes to European countries' economic diplomacy - not just in terms of procurement opportunities but, more importantly, also by assisting the creation of more rules-based, transparent and stable markets and governments and by furthering regional cooperation and integration. On the political-strategic front, the ADB's relevance should be considered in the wider context of its geography and global power shifts. Membership of the ADB offers its 17 European member countries valuable opportunities to reinforce ties with players that are quickly strengthening their role and influence in the changing world of international politics and economics. Furthermore, the Bank’s non-Western diplomatic style – which is discernible in both normative and practical terms – provides valuable lessons on how to operate successfully in tomorrow’s world, wherein European countries will be less influential.

Paper presentation 10: Herman Voogsgeerd - 'Legalization and Trade Relationships in East Asia: Does Globalization Lead to Higher Legalization?

Kahler submitted in 2000 that the region of East Asia is characterized by a low degree of legalization and formality. Nevertheless, since that year an increasing number of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements have been concluded by most of the states in East Asia. An example is the so‐called Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). These agreements, together with the accession of China to the WTO and the negotiation by 12 countries for a Transpacific trade partnership nowadays, will gradually force countries in East Asia to make their national domestic law more transparent and in conformity with the rules of the international trade regime. Many law students from China and South‐Korea study abroad in the US or in Europe, because a second foreign law degree seems to be necessary in order to

get a good job since the competition for high quality jobs in those countries is cut‐throat. What is the consequence of these developments for the nature of legalization in China and South‐Korea? Are Western elements introduced into the law of these countries or is there a recombination of modern with traditionally existent elements? Is globalization leading to more globally uniform laws in the field of trade?

Panel 4. Maritime Security Governance

Discussion Moderator: Leon Verstappen

Paper presentation 11: Oliver Bräuner - 'EU-China security cooperation and regional security in East Asia'

The EU and its member states only have very limited security interests in the Asia‐Pacific region. In the absence in the region of European long‐range power projection capacities, of significant European military capabilities and of distinctly European security interests in the region, the EU has found it difficult to define its own interests and to exert its influence on regional security issues, especially the ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. EU policy on the region has so far mostly focused on the ambitious goal of promoting regional integration, by supporting or even participating in a number of discussion forums, such as ASEAN, ASEM or the East Asia Summit. Unfortunately this has so far not resulted in increased trust between China and many of its neighbours in the region, despite the continued growth of intra‐regional trade. The EU and its member states should

therefore move beyond high‐level dialogues and focus their efforts on deepening security cooperation with China, the key economic and military player in the region. This cooperation should start on a small scale and be focused on rather specific practical or technical issues that are both feasible and mutually beneficial. This should include intensifying military and coast guard exchanges, cooperation on the protection of citizens abroad and on arms control and non‐proliferation. These measures would provide the EU with an opportunity to deepen its understanding of Chinese strategic thinking and to insert European perspectives into Chinese debates on an operational level.

Paper presentation 12: David Fouquet - 'Options for the EU in Asian Maritime Disputes'

Europe may be reaching a crossroads in its relations with Asia and its involvement in that region’s delicate and potential explosive political and security rivalries.

Japan and China in recent months have heightened their diplomatic competition to establish their claims to sovereignty or control of islands and other markers in the East China Sea and to influence Europe and other partners to support their position. Other claimants in the separate dispute in the South China Sea area are also engaged in similar actions and diplomacy.

Within a few days of each other in January, EU leaders in Brussels were conducting high-level strategic partnership and security dialogues with Chinese and Japanese counterparts. In separate meetings with Chinese State Councillor Yang Yiechi and senior Japanese diplomats, the EU officials were faced with contradictory claims and requests from their Asian strategic partners regarding maritime disputes and security policy.

While not generally considered to be a significant security presence and actor in the Asia Pacific region, Europe has had an active history of such involvement, that ranges from extremes such as its 1950s participation by Member States in the Korean war to more recent enagement as a mediator or intermediary in peace processes in Aceh or Mindanao.

Paper presentation 13: Sanne Kamerling - 'The EU and East Asian Security: Opportunities and Challenges in Maritime Security Governance'

Involvement in East Asian security is not EU’s strong suit. It does not seem to be very active nor visible as an actor in hot security topics like North Korea’s nuclear developments or maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. However, there are many interests at stake, also for the EU. Regional stability in an area where important trade partners of the EU is of great economic and political relevance to the EU. Taking an independent position in matters of East Asian security is to the benefit of the EU as its interests in the region are different than those of the dominant external security actor: the US. Also, Asian counterparts are becoming more active in maritime security in the regions neighbouring the EU, like the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean Sea. The expectations of the EU as an independent partner in security affairs in East Asia dropped dramatically over the past decade, and with that its political clout in the region. But the EU does have its opportunities coming up. In 2014, the EU will adopt an EU Maritime Strategy which gives it a chance of repositioning itself once again towards emerging regions, Asia being the most prominent. As maritime security is an issue of concern to many countries in East and Southeast Asia, this naturally gives leeway to cooperation with other actors, like the EU. This paper explores several avenues of maritime security governance in which the EU plays a role, taking the Contact Group on Piracy near the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) as a case study. In 2014, the EU will be chairing this strategic forum that functions under UN umbrella, in which many of the Asian counterparts also have a seat at the table. The question is however, what is the room for manoeuvre for the EU? And what are the gains for the EU as a security actor?

Panel Session 5. China-EU relations: Issue Perceptions, Norm Diffusion and Mutual Understanding

Discussion Moderator: Paul Rusman

Paper presentation 14: Frank Gaenssmantel & Feng Liu - 'Same Name, Different Substance? Exploring the Impact of Issue Perceptions on China-EU Relations'

Literature on China-EU relations has pointed to a variety of factors that render cooperation difficult, like for example differences in their respective regional security environments and related security constraints (Kerr 2012), divergent goals (Kinzelbach and Thelle 2011), conflicting preferences and approaches to global governance(Odgaard and Biscop 2007, Holslag 2011), distorted expectations from each other (Shambaugh 2008), or their respective relations with third actors, especially the US (Vennesson 2007). However, the impact of diverging approaches to solving concrete issues on the bilateral diplomatic agenda has so far not received much scholarly attention. To close this gap this paper will first develop a conceptual framework that will allow us to link perceptions about the nature of issues (defined as issue perceptions in this study) to specific trajectories in bilateral cooperation (or noncooperation). In a second step we will perform case studies to assess empirically the extent to which matching/mismatching issue perceptions promote/obstruct bilateral cooperation on specific issues between China and the EU. We will focus on two prominent cases, namely the Chinese request to have the EU’s arms embargo lifted and the recent dispute on solar panel imports from China. The empirical research will be largely based on the analysis of policy statements from both sides (policy papers, public comments, interviews).

Paper presentation 15: Nadya Stoynova - 'How are Norms Resisted? Insights from China’s Engagement in Regional International Organizations'

The paper seeks to contribute to the literature on norms by exploring an underdeveloped aspect of norm diffusion, namely resistance. It builds on perspectives fusing rationalist and constructivist arguments in explaining non‐compliance with norms. The European Union has been engaging China on human rights for almost two decades through its Human Rights Dialogue, with disappointing results, especially when it comes to civil and political rights which Beijing guarantees on paper but fails to enforce. The failure of the dialogue mechanism can be explained by the misfit of Western notions of human rights and the organizational culture of the Communist Party. However, China has not remained passive in the face of Western pressure. The paper looks at how the “human rights with Chinese characteristics” can be reformulated as Chinese resistance to the pressure to protect civil and political rights. Another resistance mechanism, the formation of a group of like‐minded actors is tested empirically through content analysis of documents produced by the SCO. Documents by ASEAN + 3 are also explored. SCO documents especially are indicative of shared norms between the members as well as agreement on how international cooperation should be carried out. Through socialization in interaction setting free of conflict where also common benefits accrue to the members, SCO members attach increasing value to the organization as representative of their shared values on the international stage. The type of engagement becomes even more attractive compared to the conditionality approaches used by Western norm entrepreneurs. Thus the model of interaction presented in the SCO and ASEAN + 3 becomes the standard that the members emphasize as most desirable for them.

Paper presentation 16: Ding Chun - 'Sino-EU Economic Relations and the Impact of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis'

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Panel 6. ASEM and ASEAN: Regional Integration and Regional Identity

Discussion Moderator: Jaap de Wilde

Paper presentation 17: Hiromasa Kubo - 'The EU and East Asia'

Since the end of the World War Ⅱ , Europe had reduced its presence in Asia, as many Asian countries became independent. Economic and political relationships with the U.S., on the other side of the Pacific, were more important from Asian perspective. However, due to remarkable economic developments in Asia, especially in East Asia, amongst all South Korea and China, the EU began advocating the need to establish comprehensive relations in the region, one of the examples of these being the creations of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Until now, 30 members in Europe and 21 in Asia, including China, Korea and Japan, take part in the Meeting. Furthermore, in order to strengthen economic ties with Asia, the EU has concluded a FTA with Korea and currently is under negotiations with Japan. Taking into account of economic dynamism in East Asia, both Europe and the United States have concerns over political stability and security in the region. There are still tensions there over territorial issues between China and Japan, and also between Korea and Japan. Furthermore, in East Asia, the “Cold War” pattern remains on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. The EU’s trade with East Asia has already outgrown the Trans-Atlantic trade and EU’s

direct investment in the region has reached a significant level. In an age of globalisation, distant threats may be as much concern as those that are near at hand. It is to be noted that, in Asia, there has not been established legally based comprehensive security structure, like European one. East Asia’s security environment remains volatile. To what extent, East Asian nations might be able to draw lessens from European experience is, currently, one of hot issues in the region.

Paper presentation 18: Elisa Hörhager - 'Scenarios of EU Engagement in South East Asia: Between Regional Integration and Security Dynamics'

In 2012, the EU signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, laying the groundwork for an enhanced partnership between the two regions. The EU sees its relations with ASEAN, the second most developed and integrated regional block in the world, as key to its foreign policy of promoting regional integration. It defines both entities as “natural partners” who share “a common DNA” (EU Delegation in Jakarta, 2013). However, South East Asia has also become a center of focus for security concerns in the 21st century. Not only has the Obama Administration pivoted its strategic engagement towards East Asia, but China as the regional hegemon has become an increasingly important actor in the region both in terms of trade and in terms of security. The EU has announced its willingness to be recognized as a “credible political and security player” in the region by helping to build an “effective regional security architecture with ASEAN at its center.” (EU in Asia Factsheet, 2012). In this paper, I propose to analyse the most recent shifts in EU policy towards South East Asia and how EU policy is being perceived in the region itself. With trade and business relations still dominating the relationship, how will the EU manage to continue to promote

regional integration in South East Asia while focusing on new security challenges in the region? In order to attempt an answer, I will draw up various scenarios of strengthened EU presence in the region while taking into account the dimensions of security, trade and investment flows, development, and norm transfer.

Paper presentation 19: Silja Keva - 'Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership – Just a Talking Shop or a Tool for More Participatory Asia-Europe Relations?'

Inspired by the successful first ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting Summit) summit in 1996, the European Parliament invited the parliaments of ASEM countries for a first interregional parliamentary meeting in Strasbourg the same year. The enthusiasm of the first meeting did not, however, carry much further and it was only until 2006 when the sluggish cooperation got new vigor after the adoption of the ASEP Rules of Procedure at the Helsinki meeting. In the most recent meeting in Laos 2012, altogether 250 parliamentarians from 30 countries convened to discuss topical global and interregional issues with the idea of giving input to the following ASEM leaders’ summit. ASEP process suffers from similar challenges as the ASEM: lower representation from Europe, lack of continuity and lack of follow-up. ASEP is also part of a wider post-Cold War trend of proliferation of international parliamentary institutions. These institutions have been seen as a response to globalization and as an attempt to advance participatory, transparent and accountable global governance.

This paper explores the evolution of the Asia-Europe Parliamentary dialogue and analyses the key junctures in its 18 year history vis-à-vis the larger Asia-Europe interregional framework. Furthermore, ASEP will be analyzed against the broader context of studies in similar international parliamentary institutions. Is ASEP just another talking shop or can it be seen as a tool for more participatory Asia-Europe relations?