TF Colloquium: Fabio Lampert (University of Vienna)

Title:  Freedom, Omniscience, and the Contingent A Priori

Abstract: One of the greatest problems in the philosophy of religion is
theological fatalism, that is, the claim that divine omniscience is
incompatible with free will. In this talk, I present new reasons for
being suspicious of what I think is the best argument for theological
fatalism. First, I argue that by considering divine knowledge of
contingent a priori truths, divine foreknowledge is not required for an
argument from divine omniscience against free will. Second, I show that
this argument can in turn be generalized in such a way that ordinary
human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument
against free will. This is, I take it, an absurd conclusion that is
unacceptable to theists and non-theists alike. But if there is something
wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the
argument for theological fatalism. Though there is a range of possible
responses, I suggest that what is amiss in all cases is a closure
principle, according to which having no choice about a truth is closed
under entailment (or strict implication). The Interpretation of
Conditional Chance.

This event will be followed by drinks.