Lecture on Leibniz and the (ir)reality of bodies

History of Philosophy Colloquium

Sarah Tropper (University of Graz): Can you have your cake and eat it too? For a (certain) toleration of bodies in Leibniz’s late philosophy.

In early modern rationalism, there is a slight tendency of making individual bodies disappear, and this not without reason. If we consider the metaphysical and epistemological constraints imposed on us and our philosophical theories by rationalist principles, such a disappearance is, to a certain extent, only natural. While there are general as well as more specific reasons grounded in various different metaphysical as well as physical assumptions that lead to bodies slipping through our (now metaphysically dubious) fingers, this view is in important respects nonetheless inadequate. I will argue here that this is in particular, although by no means exclusively, the case when it comes to Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics – despite, or maybe rather: due to, the fact that, up to this day, commentators cannot decide whether there are any bodies in Leibniz’s late philosophy.

I will show that there are good reasons why Leibniz should be regarded as a thinker who pushes for a tolerant attitude towards doctrinal differences on theological, epistemological and pragmatic grounds and that such an attitude gives a certain leeway for holding there are bodies as well as for holding that there are not any. In order to do so, I will draw on Maria Rosa Antognazza’s discussions of the topic of toleration, which brought an important aspect of Leibniz’s view of religious belief to the fore: The notion of ‘truth above reason’ (Theodicy, Preliminary Discourse, §§23, 60, 63; New Essays, IV, xviii). I will add to this notion another important aspect: the structural similarity between faith and experience (Theodicy, Preliminary Discourse, §1). Taking these two components as a starting point, I will argue how and why further support not only can, but also should be given to the claim that the nature of religious belief is of fundamental importance to Leibniz’ philosophical outlook in general.

I will do so, first, by analysing how this connection appears in Leibniz’s correspondence with Bartholomew Des Bosses regarding a slightly more unconventional topic of philosophical discussion (that is, transubstantiation). In a second step, I will argue how the discussion as it proceeds within this exchange naturally lends itself to be applied to more metaphysical matters regarding the nature of bodies in general and the beliefs we can hold about them. This focus on the nature of beliefs that concern ‘truth above reason’, will unearth how religious and certain philosophical beliefs come together in this particular instance, namely as beliefs that exceed pure rational analysis and are – as I will argue: due to the reasons given for religious toleration – perfectly acceptable to hold.

Overall, I aim to show the importance of Leibniz’s concept of tolerance concerning beliefs beyond the narrower sphere of theological and ecclesial matters and to argue for an extension of its application from doctrines of faith to beliefs about creation and creatures, in particular about bodies.

Sarah Tropper is assistant professor of history of philosophy at the University of Graz. She has published various articles on early modern philosophy, in particular on Spinoza and Leibniz. Her current research focuses on the influence of medieval theories of composition on early modern rationalist theories of body.