Laura Valentini: Normative Powers and Social Practices

Lecture by Laura Valentini (Munich), organized by our Centre for Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Normative powers have been the subject of complex debates in philosophy. There are rich literatures on, e.g., consent, authority, promising, and forgiveness, to name a few. Yet, there is relatively little discussion of normative powers as such, as a general category. My aim in this paper is to fill this gap. Specifically, the paper’s intended contribution is twofold: conceptual (concerning the definition of such powers) and ontological (concerning the existence conditions of such powers). On the conceptual side, I offer a general definition of normative powers—be they legal, conventional, or moral—one that I believe better captures the relevant phenomenon than alternative definitions found in the literature. On the ontological side, I argue that normative powers, including moral powers, cannot exist in the absence of social practices. Social practices conferring them on individuals are necessary existence conditions of those powers.

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