Liam Bright: Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors

Colloquium lecture by Liam Bright (London School of Economics), organized by the Department of Theoretical Philosophy

Based on a joint paper by Liam Bright (LSE) and Haixin Dang (Leeds)

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by putting forward a claim about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science —considered as just an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims put forward.

Joining

To join the talk, please register here. Registered participants will receive a link to the online platform via email shortly before the start of the talk. Please contact Leah Henderson with any questions.